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Abstract: This study introduces a comprehensive model of institutional grafting by 
examining the formation of legal institutions as shaped by three forces: (1) cultural, (2) 
structural, and (3) political. The model is used to argue that a country's growth rates are a 
function of the distance that new legal institutions develop to these three forces. We 
demonstrate that the potential size of such distance varies depending on the phase of 
institutional change in which legal institutions emerge: drift/evolution or critical junctures. 
When a country drifts along the established institutional path, the distance is likely to be 
minimal, enabling rapid economic development. When a country changes its institutional 
path, the distance proves large and hinders economic growth. These propositions are tested 
empirically based on a sample of 53 countries for the period from 1996 to 2008. The post-
communist transition is used as an example of critical junctures. 
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Institutional Grafting as a Three-Dimensional Phenomenon 
 
Introduction 
Growth theory asserts that good formal institutions are conducive to rapid economic 
development. Empirical evidence from economically developed and developing countries 
largely supports this statement (Chen and Feng 1996; Eicher and Leukert 2009; Klomp and 
de Haan 2009; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002). Post-communist economies are either 
excluded from this analysis, because they represent a particularly unusual group (Bosworth 
and Collins 2003) and lack data for reasonably long periods. Or they are addressed 
independently by research that reduces the definition of their formal institutions to political 
indexes (Grogan and Moers 2001), or progress in economic reforms (Falcetti, Lysenko, and  
Sanfey  2006; Fidrmuc and Tichit  2009) while omitting legal institutions, such as property 
rights and contract enforcement legislation, from their analysis. 
This gap is filled by Eastern European scholars who often point to certain peculiarities in 
institutional effects that impact economic growth during a transition. In contrast to the 
conventional view, they assert that introducing legal institutions per se may rarely lead to 
economic prosperity in the former soviet economies (Mau 2008; Polischuk 2008; Polterovich 
2008). Their institutional reforms are believed to promote only the redistribution of economic 
or political power without causing any substantial change in economic growth (Dementiev 
and Vishnevskiy 2011).  
Growth theory does recognize that heterogeneity is possible in the effects of formal 
institutions on growth rates, attributing its sources to either the level of maturity of formal 
institutions (Barro 1997; Fidrmuc and Tichit 2009) or a country’s level of economic 
prosperity (Eicher and Leukert 2009; Lee and Kim 2009). We question whether these two 
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explanations are appropriate for post-communist countries. These countries began their 
institutional reforms from a relatively similar platform with only minor variations in the 
levels of their economic development and the type and degree of institutional maturity. 
However, they experienced very different success rates in terms of their economic 
performance. We argue that the distinct relationship between formal institutions and 
economic growth in the post-communist area can be better explained if one describes the 
transition as the process of changing their institutional path. Hence, one must understand 
features of institutional shifts at critical junctures.  
The latter proposition requires constructing a theoretical model that juxtaposes the logic of 
institution building during drift/evolution versus at critical junctures to identify possible 
implications that these two institutional formation processes imply for a country’s growth 
dynamics. For the purpose of this research, we narrow the concept of formal institutions to 
legal institutions, such as property rights and contract enforcement legislation, since they are 
keys to economic growth (North 1990) and have been the least successfully reformed in post-
communist countries (Aslund 2007).  
 
Theoretical Model 
Institutional economics distinguishes between two phases of institutional development: 
drift/evolution and critical junctures. The first describes institutional change that occurs in 
small cumulative stages within an established institutional path. The second considers radical 
changes that result from a country's exposure to shocks sufficient to break society out of the 
outmoded, suboptimal path and shift into a new one (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Each 
phase of institutional change is characterized by a distinct logic of the institutional formation 
process, affecting economic development in a certain way.  
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We introduce a new conceptual framework to juxtapose the two possible instances in the 
dynamics of legal institutions. Since we primarily focus on post-communist transition 
economies, our point of departure is derived from the logic of a free-market economy defined 
as an economic system based on the exchange of goods and services between economic 
agents at market prices (Aslund 2007). Given this definition, we suggest that the formation of 
legal rules regulating the exchange process can be understood by accounting for: (1) 
economic agents' values and attitudes concerning production and exchange processes; (2) the 
economic system's structural elements in which production and exchange occur; and (3) the 
behavior of actors who devise legal rules that regulate interactions between economic agents. 
Based on this logic, we present institutional grafting as shaped by three forces that 
correspond to three dimensions of the institutional space: (1) cultural, (2) structural, and (3) 
political.  
The first dimension includes cultural values (Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson 2008; Portes 
2006) that are similar to North's concept of informal institutions (North 1990). For simplicity, 
we confine culture to the following four aspects: control, respect, trust, and obedience 
(Tabellini 2008). Control reflects the extent to which a person's individual effort is rewarded 
(Tabellini 2008). Respect and trust govern people's attitudes towards interacting with one 
another (Shikida, de Araujo Jr., and Sant'Anna 2011). Obedience reflects the likelihood that 
individuals abide by formal or informal rules/agreements (Shikida, de Araujo Jr., and 
Sant'Anna 2011).  
The second dimension is structural and encompasses economic forces that reflect a 
country's economic infrastructure and the nature of economic arrangements. It predefines the 
extent to which a country's economic system is in tune with the logic of free-market 
economic processes. As such, we select the following aspects of the free-market economic 
structure: privatization, competition, price liberalization, trade liberalization, and capital 
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market creation (Aslund 2007). Common sense suggests that exchanges can only be 
established on the basis of private ownership of the means of production and hence require 
privatization. To ensure market efficiency for the exchange of goods, free competition and 
the deregulation of prices and trade must exist. Finally, real capital markets must also be 
established to enable the rational allocation of capital.  
The third dimension is called political and includes two political forces (Portes 2006): (1) 
the balance of power between the main political actors and (2) the quality of political 
institutions. Regarding the first aspect, we distinguish between three main political actors 
involved in the formation of legal institutions: political elites, economic elites, and the broad 
population. Political elites deal with the formalization of new institutions and can possess a 
certain level of political control consistent with their ability to protect their own power, 
mainly through access to the country's military resources. Economic elites stem from Olson's 
idea of vested interests (Olson 1982), which are reduced to business interest groups in society 
and their ability to promote rent-seeking through the institutional framework. The broad 
population reflects the potential level of resistance from the masses to formal institutions that 
are already in place or institutional change being promoted by political and/or economic 
elites. The interests that prevail are expected to shape the main features of legal institutions. 
When the balance of power shifts towards political or economic elites, more extractive formal 
institutions emerge, whereas more inclusive institutions emerge when the population's 
interests dominate (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Aslund 2007). In turn, political 
institutions comprise the rules that formalize the prevailing interests into a legal framework. 
In line with the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis (Eicher and Leukert 2009), they are 
assumed to be exogenous to legal institutions. Their quality and flexibility predefine how far 
and how fast existing interests are incorporated into a new legal institutional framework 
(Davis 2010).  
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It is believed that the three dimensions are related to each other in some way. However, 
that issue is beyond the scope of our analysis. Instead, we suggest that legal institutions 
should be commensurate with the logic of each of the three dimensions in order to function 
effectively and promote economic development. Consequently, economic growth is viewed 
as a function of the level of congruence between new legal institutions and these three 
dimensions: When they appear to be more compatible, fewer frictions emerge during the 
exchange process, making more transactions possible and leading to higher rates of economic 
growth. We further argue that the level of this congruence may vary across the phases of 
institutional change (drift/evolution or critical junctures) and can be a priory identified from 
the logic of institution building in each of these phases.  
From this perspective, the logic of the (evolutionary) institutional change that occurs 
during a drift along the established institutional path can be described as follows. As 
economic agents operate, they accumulate knowledge and experiences, which leads to 
technological advancements and further promotes the division of labor (Davis 2010). This 
changes the organization of production processes in a country and shifts the structural 
dimension by establishing new industries, competition terms, pricing mechanisms, and 
conditions of resource allocation across various economic sectors. Profound change in the 
economic domain may also lead to the evolution of values and attitudes. Changes in the 
division of labor or the levels of specialization may involve more interactions during 
production processes and encourage higher levels of trust and respect among economic 
agents to support such exchanges. Similarly, new technologies may shift the perceptions of 
economic agents about potential rewards for their efforts and give rise to new organizational 
modes in their businesses. As a consequence, existing legal institutions may no longer be 
commensurate with both structural and cultural dimensions, thus raising market transaction 
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costs (North 1990). Contractual arrangements create demand for institutional change that 
lowers transaction costs in exploiting new opportunities (Pejovich 1999).  
In trying to bypass existing inconsistencies, economic agents start to introduce informal 
changes (Eggertsson 1997) in formal “rules of the game” to make the institutional framework 
more flexible. Initiated from within the economy, these informal changes are expected to be 
fully commensurate with prevailing cultural values and the economy's new structural 
characteristics and are derived from the country's current levels of obedience, which ensures 
their enforcement. If these changes are efficient and compatible with the interests of political 
elites (Portes 2006), they are adopted by the political system, which formalizes them through 
existing political institutions, giving them the status of formal legal institutions. Since the 
need for institutional reforms arises from economic agents' functioning, there can be no 
essential change in the balance of power or the emergence of frictions between the main 
political actors or the political institutions in force. However, the flexibility of political 
institutions predetermines how rapidly legal institutional reforms meeting the new demands 
are implemented (Davis 2010). The evolution of money (Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson 2008) 
is a classical example of drift-phase institutional reforms.  
The logic of institutional evolution in the drift phase entails the following: First, the 
formation process is initiated by economic agents, as a result of which new legal institutions 
are likely to be congruent with the cultural dimension. Second, legal institutions are expected 
to be fully compatible with the structural dimension, since any change in the old institutions 
largely occurs as a reaction to changes in economic processes or technologies. Third, the role 
of political elites in institution building is relatively inferior and restricted to the 
formalization of institutional change that previously emerged at the micro-level. Overall, 
these three features imply that institutional reforms during the drift phase are likely to 
produce legal institutions that are fully commensurate with the three dimensions.  
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The logic of institutional reforms at critical junctures differs substantially from the drift-
phase logic. Critical junctures are characterized by radical change of the political order that 
may occur through revolutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) as recent events in Arabic 
countries demonstrate. Or, these phases may take place in a peaceful manner without wars 
and coups (Olson 1982) as in the majority of post-communist countries after the collapse of 
socialism (Aslund 2007). The economic crisis, caused by shortcomings of the previous 
regime and discontent among the population with the current conditions, usually serve as the 
main drivers behind this political change.  
The latter alteration generally leads to changes among political elites and introduces new 
political institutions to legitimize the new political regime. Additionally, the economic 
system must adjust to the new political logic, which explains the need for adopting new legal 
institutions that are commensurate with the new political principles concerning economic 
relations. Many pitfalls exist at various stages of carrying out institutional reforms at critical 
junctures. First, a shift in the political power and the initial immaturity of new political 
institutions may create a temporary vacuum of power and opportunities for political and 
economic elites to seek rents through the new legal institutional framework (Aslund 2007). 
Second, even if this is not the case and the population's interests dominate in the process of 
building a new legal institutional framework, the quality of the new legal institutions 
ultimately depends on whether political elites incumbent to handle the institutional formation 
process are sufficiently familiar with the new economic system and relevant legal rules. 
Third, since such knowledge and skills are often missing, it is likely that building a new 
institutional framework involves borrowing legal rules from countries with political and 
economic orders close to those desired. As a result, the new legal institutions become 
imposed from without (Pejovich 1999), which could lead to two kinds of problems.  
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On the one hand, implanting foreign institutions into another local context may disturb 
their congruence with characteristics of the structural dimension already in force. The 
introduction of Western industrial legislation in CIS countries is a good example of this. The 
new rules proved inefficient for post-communist economic systems, since Western legislation 
was designed for postindustrial societies with a prevalence of medium and small businesses, 
while many CIS economies were characterized by the overrepresentation of large (state) 
enterprises (Polterovich and Popov 2006). Reforms may be necessary to transform the 
structural dimension and hence narrow the differences between the recipient- and source-
countries of legal institutions. If this need is not recognized and institutional change is 
expected to generate the required structural change, then new legal institutions, even those of 
good quality, may appear suboptimal in the new conditions (Eggertsson 1997).  
On the other hand, a similar incongruence may also emerge between new legal institutions 
and the local cultural dimension (Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson 2008; Kyriazis and 
Zouboulakis 2005; Portes 2006). Because culture is unique, economic agents may perceive 
and interpret the newly imported legal institutions through the prism of their specific values, 
as a result of which the meanings assigned by economic agents to new laws might appear 
completely different from their initial context (Portes 2006). The imported legal institutions 
may, for instance, be designed to supplement certain levels of trust and respect that can be 
different from levels actually existing in the recipient society. Efficient enforcement of new 
laws may also require a certain level of obedience that could differ from what is actually 
internalized by local economic agents. Such inconsistencies may further lead to a mutation of 
new legal institutions (Vernikov 2009) or low levels of their enforcement (Portes 2006). 
Political bodies that adapt new legal rules to the peculiarities of national cultures or advertise 
the superiority of new values to local economic agents may ensure that local cultural values 
smoothly blend with the logic of new legal institutions.  
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In theory, it is unlikely that both kinds of incongruence can be entirely eliminated when the 
transition from an old to a new institutional path begins. The learning experience is expected 
to minimize or eliminate them (Nelson and Sampat 2001). If policymakers design and 
introduce adjustment policies for the orderly operation of the system at each stage of the 
transition period, the gap between new legal institutions and economic structures is believed 
to be gradually narrowed. Similarly, if economic actors learn that acting according to new 
rules can expand their opportunity set, they may shift their values (Eggertsson 1997) and 
conform to the new culture. The existence of learning processes implies, however, that there 
will be some lags between the initiation of fundamental institutional change and the point at 
which relevant actors get the three dimensions right (Eggertsson 1997).  
One can derive the following features of the path-breaking process of institution formation 
at critical junctures: First, institutional change is profound and may include the introduction 
of radical institutional reforms by implanting foreign institutions into the local systems. It is 
likely that these legal institutions will be incompatible with existing cultures, at least at the 
initial reform stage. Second, similar distances may exist between the new legal institutions 
and the current economic structures for the same reason as above. Third, the role of political 
elites is superior and cannot be confined to legalizing new institutions but extends to their 
selection, design, introduction, and subsequent adjustments to the cultural and structural 
dimensions in place. The quality of new legal institutions might hence depend on the quality 
of the country's political change and the professionalism of political elites incumbent to 
handle institutional grafting under the new conditions. In sum, these three features suggest 
that institutional change at critical junctures is unlikely to produce legal institutions that are 
fully congruent with our model's three dimensions.  
One should note that this is only a general distinction as we solely described two ideal 
cases. Various hybrids that re-combine features from both types of institutional formation are 
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certainly possible. Even when the country does not deviate from the old institutional path, 
policymakers may, for instance, intervene in the formation of institutions by introducing rules 
of the game that were previously foreign to the system. Such reforms however concern only a 
few institutional elements so that the total institutional change is relatively small and cannot 
cause the emergence of any distance between legal institutions and the cultural, economic, or 
political dimensions. The opening of previously closed professions in Greece, which required 
only a few adjustments in the competition law, is a good illustration of this case. Profound 
institutional change may also happen but only incrementally, as substantial alterations in 
legal institutions or in the entire institutional framework occur slowly (Efendic, Pugh, and 
Adnett 2011), giving enough time for the three dimensions to co-evolve with legal 
institutions.  
The odds of ensuring congruence between the new legal institutions and the three 
dimensions differ substantially for the two phases of institutional dynamics. This allows us to 
conclude that economies might be endowed with different opportunity sets for growth, 
depending on the phase in which new legal rules emerge. We now postulate three 
implications that our analytical framework offers to growth theory. 
Implication 1: Legal institutions that emerge during a drift phase are more likely to be 
compatible with the three dimensions and will more effectively enhance economic 
development than legal institutions introduced at critical junctures.  
Implication 2: Since institutional change at critical junctures is usually radical and 
profound, it may require a learning process for both political elites and economic agents at 
least in the short run. Political elites need some time to experiment and learn how to design 
and operate new formal institutions. Economic agents must also gain experience operating 
under the new rules. The learning processes might also be non-linear, and as institutional 
elements approach an optimal design, they must induce a better learning process.  
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Implication 3: Since institutional change at critical junctures presupposes a transformation 
of the entire institutional framework and the introduction of a totally new set of legal 
institutions, economic development becomes a function of the experience and skillfulness of 
politicians who handle the institutional design. Their ability to choose the appropriate set of 
institutions predetermines the extent to which institution building processes are successful 
and newly imported legal institutions are of good qualities. Their ability to introduce 
measures aimed at adjusting the cultural and structural dimensions to the new legal rules 
predetermines whether these legal institutions will survive and function effectively. By 
contrast, institutional reforms during the drift phase are characterized by insignificant 
cumulative changes and seldom require the government to institute such adaptation measures.  
Based on these propositions, we postulate six hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Countries that minimize the distance between the logic of their legal 
institutions and the three dimensions are expected to exhibit better economic performance.  
Hypothesis 2: Legal institutions are expected to develop a closer relationship to economic 
growth when they emerge during the drift phase rather than at critical junctures.   
Hypothesis 3: Political institutions are expected to develop a closer relationship to 
economic growth at critical junctures than during the drift phase.  
Hypothesis 4: At critical junctures, improvements in the quality of political 
institutions/elites are expected to lessen the negative effect of the distance variables on 
economic growth. 
Hypothesis 5: Because of the learning process, improvements in legal institutions at critical 
junctures are expected to lead to non-linear improvements in rates of economic growth.  
Hypothesis 6: At critical junctures, countries that manage to simultaneously improve both 
legal institutions and the three dimensions are expected to have greater improvements in their 
economic performance on the new institutional path.  
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Data and Method Description 
To test our hypotheses, we use Eicher’s and Leukert’s (2009) approach of splitting the 
sample into subsamples and conducting an empirical analysis for each of them separately. 
Our first subsample includes post-communist transition countries that are considered a good 
example for the path-breaking process of institution building. They exhibit sufficient 
variations across the three dimensions, legal institutions, and the overall success levels 
concerning economic performance. They also experienced the shock of transitioning from 
socialism to a new path at a relatively similar time.  
The subsample for the drift economies includes developed and developing countries that 
(1) have not experienced any recent radical change in their political regime and are 
considered as being in the drift phase of institutional development; and (2) have participated 
in at least one wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) during the analyzed period from 
which many operationalizations are sourced. To ensure that the difference in the subsample 
sizes does not lead to differences in coefficients or their significance tests, we kept the second 
subsample relatively small. Appendix 1 lists the countries included in each of the subsamples.   
In line with Pääkkönen’s study (2010), we use yearly data for the period from 1996 to 
2008. We exclude the first transition years from the analysis since the outset of transition 
entailed profound systemic changes (Fidrmuc 2003) or a deep economic recession. A total of 
53 countries is used, with the drift subsample containing 31 countries and the critical 
junctures subsample including 22 countries. They serve as the basis for our analysis but are 
expanded to include other countries if operationalizations for them are available.  
We follow Tabellini (2008) in measuring culture and source the relevant measures from 
the WVS. Obedience represents the percentage of people in the sample who mentioned 
obedience as an important factor in society. Trust and respect are positive responses to 
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questions about trusting most of the people and whether most people show tolerance and 
respect towards others. Control is operationalized through the question about how much 
freedom of choice and control people have over their own lives. The aggregate variable is 
constructed by adding up the values of control, respect, and trust, and subtracting the value of 
obedience as in Shikida, de Araujo Jr., and Sant'Anna  (2011). The final index is rescaled to 
take values ranging from 0 to 1. The "culture" variable is available only on a cross-sectional 
basis, since many countries included in the subsamples participated in only one wave of the 
WVS. 
The structural dimension is measured by the EBRD indexes, which report on the progress 
countries make in shifting towards a market economy in the following fields: price 
liberalization, foreign exchange and trade liberalization, small scale privatization, large scale 
privatization, enterprise reform, competition policy, banking reform, and non-banking 
financial institutions. The aggregate index is constructed by replicating Fidrmuc's and Tichit's 
(2009) component factor analysis that captures the extent to which the selected submeasures 
load on the common construct. We first calculate weights for each indicator in the aggregate 
index and then multiply the values of the sub-indexes by their weight scores for each year and 
for each country. The final index is rescaled to take values ranging from 0 to 1. The data for 
the economic structure is available on an annual basis but only for the set of post-communist 
countries.  
The political dimension is operationalized through a number of indexes. We use World 
Bank institutional indexes (corruption control in the government, regulatory quality, and 
government effectiveness) to measure the quality of political elites in power. Political control 
is measured through a WVS question in which respondents are asked to specify how much 
confidence they have in the police with the responses rescaled to vary from 1 "no confidence 
at all" to 4 "a great deal of confidence." The extent to which a country is captured by big 
15 
interests is operationalized through WVS questions asking whether the country is run by 
interest groups or for everyone's benefit. We calculate the percentage of people in each 
country who responded positively to the second part of the question (for everyone's benefit). 
The population's potential level of resistance is measured through three questions that ask 
whether respondents would engage in the following political actions: (1) sign a petition, (2) 
join boycotts, or (3) attend lawful peaceful demonstrations, with each having a three-point 
response scale: 1 - have done, 2 - might do, and 3 - would never do. A factor analysis shows 
that the three questions load on the same construct and produce high reliability (Croncbach's 
alpha = 0.743). We sum up the responses to obtain the index of resistance. A principle 
component factor analysis is then used to confirm that the four sub-measures ((a) the quality 
of political elites, (b) capture by interest groups, (c) confidence in the police, and (d) index of 
resistance) load on the same construct and provide a high reliability (Croncbach's alpha = 
0.875). We follow Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) and construct a single measure for the political 
dimension by applying the component factor analysis. The values of the new variable are 
rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. As with the cultural dimension, the operationalization for 
the political dimension is only available on a cross-sectional basis since most of the measures 
are derived from the WVS. 
We also construct a proxy for the political dimension by using the World Bank 
institutional indexes measuring the quality of political institutions. They are available on an 
annual basis and enable tracing the dynamics of the distance between the quality of political 
institutions/elites and legal institutions. In doing so, we only select four indexes - voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the control of government 
corruption - to make the new variable close to our initial measure of the political dimension. 
We further apply Fidrmuc's and Tichit's approach (2009) to construct a single measure for 
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political institutions and rescale its values to vary between 0 and 1 by accounting for the fact 
that the initial values of the indexes range between -2.5 and 2.5.  
The quality of economic institutions is operationalized through the index of protection of 
property rights and legal enforcement of contracts provided by the Economic Freedom of the 
World. Their initial values vary from 1 (poorly defined economic institutions) to 10 (well-
defined economic institutions), but are rescaled to range between 0 and 1. The descriptive 
statistics for the key variables are provided in table 1. Correlations between the key variables 
are reported in table 2.  
 
Table 1 and Table 2 near here 
 
To test our hypotheses empirically, we use five analytical strategies. Strategy 1: We 
demonstrate that the distance between legal institutions and the selected dimensions are 
important determinants of economic growth in the long run (hypothesis 1). To do so, we 
conduct a cross-sectional analysis for the two subsamples by averaging out values for the 
relevant variables over the period from 1996 to 2008. We omit the structural dimension from 
the analysis due to lacking data for the drift subsample. The functional form of our empirical 
model is as follows:  
Yj=β0+β1Distance_to_cultural_dimj+β2Distance_to_political_dimj+β3Legal_instj+εj,      (1) 
where Y is GDP per capita, Legal_inst is legal institutional indexes. The Distance variables 
measure the percentage by which the development of legal institutions deviates from the 
trends in the selected dimensions and are calculated as follows:  
 Distance = [(Legal institutional index - Dimensions' value)/ Dimensions' value]            (2) 
Since we believe that there is a correlation between the three dimensions, we use a 
simultaneous equation model to check the robustness of our results. The basic econometric 
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specification consists of a series of four structural relationships that describe the behavior of 
the endogenous variables. More specifically, the model includes a cross-country growth 
equation and three channel equations, one for the country's culture, one for the country's 
political dimension, and the last one for legal institutions. We use an instrumental variables 
estimation to ensure that our structural parameters are identified. In addition, we include 
other control variables in the channel equations so that the number of inclusions is sufficient 
for the order condition for identification to be satisfied. We estimate the full set of equations 
jointly using three-stage least square by applying STATA command reg3. The functional 
form of the model is as follows: 
GDP_per_capitaj=α0 + α 1Distance_to_cultural_dimj + α 2Distance_to_political_dimj + 
α3Legal_instj + εj.                                                                                                                    (3)                                                                                                               
Cultural_dimj=β0+β1Fractj+β2Protestantj+β3Catholicj+β4Latitudej+ϕj.                           (4) 
Political_dimj=λ0+λ1Fractj+λ2Protestantj+λ3Catholicj+λ4Civ_liberj+ξj.                          (5) 
Legal_instj=δ0+δ1Fractj+δ2Protestantj+δ3Catholicj+δ4Legal_origj+θj,                            (6) 
where GDP_per_capita is GDP per capita averaged over the period 1996-2008. The 
Distance variables measure the distance between legal institutions and the dimensions 
calculated as in eq. (2). Legal_inst are legal institutional indexes, Fract is the ethnic 
fractionalization index, and Protestant and Catholic are the percentages of a country's 
population who are Protestant or Catholic, according to La Porta et al. (1999).  
In line with Fidrmuc (2003), we use a civil liberties (Civ_liber) index as an instrument for 
the political dimension. The correlation between the two variables is around 0.85, while it 
remains considerably weaker with legal institutions or the measure of culture. We further 
follow La Porta et al. (1999) and Shikida, de Araujo Jr., and Sant'Anna (2011) and instrument 
legal institutions with the origin of the legal code (Legal_orig), while latitude (Latitude) is 
used as an instrument for culture. Shikida, de Araujo Jr., and Sant'Anna (2011) and Tabellini 
18 
(2008) demonstrated that such instruments are sufficiently adequate in theory to isolate the 
channels through which legal rules or cultures affect economic growth. Both variables are 
obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). 
Strategy 2: We demonstrate that the short-term effects of legal and political institutions on 
economic growth are heterogeneous across the drift phase and at critical junctures 
(Hypotheses 2 and 3). To test these hypotheses empirically, we use the dynamic GMM 
method proposed by Arellano and Bond (Arellano and Bover 1995; Bond, Hoeffler, and 
Temple 2001) and well-documented in Pääkkönen (2010) and Lee and Kim (2009). It 
requires that the equation is first-differenced to eliminate the heterogeneity in production 
functions, and then an instrumental variable method is applied on the differenced model, with 
lagged values of the endogenous variables used as instruments for the variables themselves. 
To avoid an overfitting bias, we restrict instruments only to the first, second, and third lags of 
the respective variables, since they usually correlate most closely to the major explanatory 
variables (Pääkkönen 2010). We further use the STATA sub-option collapse to create one 
instrument for each variable and lag distance rather than one for each time period, variable, 
and lag distance. We also add the sub-options small to request small-sample corrections to 
the covariance matrix estimate. We calculate the two step estimator instead of the one step. 
To demonstrate the correctness of the model, we report the number of instruments generated 
by the model, the results from a Hansen overidentification test, and the Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) serial correlation in the residuals. We apply the same model to both subsamples 
while ensuring that a standard set of conditioning variables and standard periods are used. 
STATA command extabond2 is used for calculating the model parameters. 
Our model takes on the following functional form: 
lnYt=αlnYit-1+β1Legal_instit+(β2Political_instit)+β3lnKit+β4lnMSit+εit.                                             (7)                                                                                                                                                                                     
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where Y is annual rates of economic growth, Yit-1 is one-period-lagged economic growth. 
Legal_inst and Politcial_inst measure the quality of legal or political institutions respectively 
and are included in the model sequentially. K operationalizes the investment in physical 
capital measured through gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. MS represents the 
macroeconomic stability captured by annual consumer price inflation.  
Strategy 3: We demonstrate that the quality of political elites/political institutions are of 
particular importance in mitigating the effects of the distance from legal institutions to the 
three dimensions on the economic development of countries at critical junctures (hypothesis 
4). In doing so, we include interaction terms between the distance variables and the political 
institutions variables: 
lnYt=αlnYit-1+β1Political_inst+β2Distanceit+β3lnteraction+εit.                                                               (8)                                                                                                                                                                                     
where Politcial_inst measures the quality of political institutions. Distance is the distance 
between the quality of a country's legal institutions and the three dimensions. Interaction is 
an interaction term between the distance variable and political institutional scores. Since 
cultural measures are available on a cross-sectional basis, we calculate annual distances 
between legal institutions and the cultural dimension as differences between legal scores for 
every year and the constant cultural scores. Our main assumption here is that culture remains 
relatively stable over the period analyzed. We also transform the distance to the political 
dimension, by limiting it to differences between legal scores and the World Bank indexes of 
the quality of a country's political system and political elites that are available for all selected 
countries on a yearly basis. As in strategy 2, we use the Arellano and Bond dynamic GMM 
method for testing our hypotheses.   
Strategy 4: We analyze whether the relationship between legal institutions and economic 
growth is non-linear at critical junctures (hypothesis 5). The latter objective is achieved by 
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introducing a quadratic term in equation (7) while applying the Arellano and Bond dynamic 
GMM method to panel data for the entire period from 1996 to 2008. 
Strategy 5: We demonstrate that both the quality of legal institutions and their distance to 
the three dimensions are important in defining the potential for economic growth in post-
communist countries (hypothesis 6). For this purpose, we carry out a prediction exercise that 
simulates post-communist countries' GDP per capita given their current characteristics 
(savings rates, enrolment rates in tertiary education, and government size) and assume that: 
(1) legal institutional indexes take the maximum values, (2) the quality of the three 
dimensions is maximized, and (3) both condition 1 and condition 2 are achieved 
simultaneously. The STATA gllasim option (for more details see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008) is used for this purpose. We use cross-sectional time series for the period from 1996 to 
2008 but treat them as a cross-sectional sample in which years represent cases grouped by 
countries. The procedure presupposes first conducting a multilevel analysis of GDP per 
capita and then calculating predictions. One should note that when used repeatedly, gllasim 
always produces a different answer, suggesting that the latter may be sampling from a 
distribution of the parameter estimates. To minimize this effect, we generate predictions that 
are repeated 100 times and are averaged out in the end, which makes the process akin to a 
Monte Carlo simulation. We calculate a mean value of such predictions for each country and 
report it as compared to the actual value of GDP per capita averaged over the period 
analyzed. 
 
Empirical Results 
Our empirical results support our hypotheses overall. They suggest that increasing the 
distance between legal institutions and the political dimension may worsen a country's 
economic performance (table 3, model 1). A similar relationship is found between GDP per 
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capita and the distance to the cultural dimension, but only after controlling for the actual 
quality of legal institutions (table 3, model 2). We therefore receive support for our 
assumption that economic growth is sensitive not only to the actual quality of legal rules, but 
also to their congruence with the interests of public and private actors and cultural 
norms/values prevalent in society (hypothesis 1). The results remain valid even after 
controlling for correlations between the two dimensions and legal institutions (table 4).  
 
Table 3 and 4 near here 
 
The analysis of the short-term relationship between growth rates and legal institutions 
(table 5) indicates that legal rules are strong determinants of economic growth rates during a 
drift phase but tend to be only weak predictors of development for countries at critical 
junctures (hypothesis 2). Rather, growth rates of the latter group become sensitive to the 
actual quality of political institutions, which is commensurate with hypothesis 3. To further 
understand the role of political bodies at critical junctures, we introduce interactions between 
political institutions and the distance between legal institutions and the three dimensions. 
Models 3 and 5 (table 5) suggest that an increase in the distance to the cultural and structural 
dimensions may slow economic growth. Their final effect is conditioned by the actual quality 
of political institutions: If political institutions are mature, they may cushion the negative 
impact of such distance, supporting hypothesis 4. We do not however find a similar 
relationship in the case of the political dimension (model 4, table 5). By contrast, countries do 
better when they manage to surpass existing political constraints and introduce higher quality 
legal institutions than their political systems would allow. 
 
Tables 5 near here 
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Isolating the sample of post-communist countries allows us to further analyze the 
peculiarities of legal institutional effects on growth at critical junctures. Introducing a 
quadratic term into the growth equation reveals that the short-term impact of legal institutions 
on growth rates of transition economies might be non-linear, which is consistent with 
hypothesis 5 (table 6, model 2). An improvement in the protection of property rights and 
contract enforcement legislation may affect growth negatively, especially if they are poorly 
devised. Nonetheless, as institutional indexes improve, the negative effect tends to gradually 
turn into a positive one, which is in line with Fidrmuc's and Tichit's (2009) findings on the 
impact of the overall success of economic reforms on the economic development of post-
communist countries.  
 
Table 6 near here 
 
The non-linearity in the relationship between legal institutions and economic growth that 
was found at critical junctures also suggests that economies may grow even if legal 
institutions are poorly developed. This is commensurate with the conventional idea that 
growth is possible even under extractive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
Accounting for the level of legal institutions' enforcement (the corruption variable) may 
contribute to clarifying these unusual results. The negative sign on the corruption variable 
(table 6, model 5) indicates that the poor enforcement of formal institutions might be a 
positive determinant of a country’s economic performance. Accounting for the interaction 
between legal indexes and the corruption variable suggests that improving enforcement levels 
of formal institutions, without reforming them, may hinder economic development in 
countries that change their institutional path (table 6, model 5). But, if both policies are 
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combined, the main negative effect is offset and reducing corruption begins to foster 
economic development. 
 
Table 7 near here 
 
Finally, to juxtapose the relative importance of institutional reforms and changes in the 
three dimensions, we conduct a prediction exercise. Table 7 reveals that improving legal 
institutions that are not accompanied by a positive change in the three dimensions may allow 
countries at critical junctures to grow faster, with the ultimate change remaining relatively 
modest. Better results are obtained if the values of all three dimensions are maximized. The 
greatest improvements in transition economies' GDP per capita are, however, gained only 
when both groups of determinants (legal scores and the three dimensions) attain the 
maximum values. This suggests that countries will only succeed in fostering economic 
development on a new institutional path when legal institutional reform is combined with 
adapting the cultural, structural, and political dimensions to the new institutional logic. We 
hence receive support for hypothesis 6.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study introduces the idea that institutional grafting is shaped by three forces: cultural, 
structural, and political. The success of institutional reforms depends not only on the actual 
quality of newly introduced legal institutions but also on the distance that these institutions 
develop to the three dimensions. The potential size of the distance is considered a function of 
the phase in which such institutions emerge. If countries introduce institutional reforms along 
the established institutional path during the drift phase, new legal institutions are expected to 
be congruent with the logic of the three dimensions and will hence promote their economic 
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development. If countries reform their legal institutions at critical junctures, the distance is 
more likely to be substantial. The institutional effects on growth rates may then acquire two 
specific features. On the one hand, legal institutions will have a problematic association with 
economic growth in the short run due to their incompatibility with the three dimensions. On 
the other hand, the quality of the political system and associated policymaking decisions is 
important: A key precondition for rapid economic development is a government's ability to 
introduce effective adjustment policies that minimize the distance between legal institutions 
and the local economic structure, along with the political and cultural environments.   
Additional research is needed to further validate our model. The optimal test of this model 
would be to conduct an experiment that juxtaposes different ways of reforming legal 
institutions and the three dimensions on a set of economies with initially similar conditions 
but ultimately different levels of success. The feasibility of reforming the three dimensions as 
such should also be discussed. The fact that the vast majority of post-communist countries 
appeared to be more successful in creating market economies as opposed to democratic 
political systems or establishing effective capitalist cultures (Aslund 2007) suggests that the 
choice might be less about the optimal sequence or optimal combination of reforms, and 
more about what is actually possible during the transition window between the old and the 
new institutional path.  
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 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 
Variable No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
The Drift Subsample       
GDP per capita growth 310 2.546 2.964   -15.500 10.590 
GDP per capita  310 13.193 9.014 0.580   31.357 
Legal  institutions 274 0.666 0.192 0.240 0.960 
Political institutions 310 0.580 0.924 -1.361 1.673 
Cultural dimension    310 0.625 0.171 0.313 1.000 
Distance to Cultural dimension   274 0.036 0.132 -0.334 0.384 
Political dimension   310 0.551 0.292 0.055 1.000 
Distance to Political dimension   274 0.107 0.127 -0.103 0.449 
Structural dimension   Not available 
Distance to Structural dimension   Not available 
The Critical Junctures Subsample       
GDP per capita growth 210 5.723 4.317 -9.680 26.000 
GDP per capita  210 7.117 3.999 1.857 20.566 
Legal  institutions  150 0.582 0.090 0.340 0.870 
Political institutions 210 0.451 0.635 -1.557 0.816 
Cultural dimension    210 0.551 0.054 0.470 0.645 
Distance to Cultural dimension   150 0.026 0.097 -0.254 0.262 
Political dimension   210   0.322 0.177   0.001 0.637 
Distance to Political dimension   150 0.212 0.127 -0.023 0.531 
Structural dimension   210 0.693 0.190 0.083 1.000 
Distance to Structural dimension   150 -0.179 0.118 -0.378 0.233 
 
  
Table 2 
Correlation Coefficients Calculated for the Main Variables 
 GDP per 
capita 
growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Cultural 
dimension 
 
Political 
dimension 
 
D_to 
Cultural_dim 
 
D_to 
Political_dim 
 
Legal  
institutions 
Political 
institutions 
Structural 
dimension 
D_to 
Structural_dim 
GDP per capita 
growth 
1.000          
GDP per capita 
  
-0.284 1.000         
Cultural dimension 
 
-0.238   0.782 1.000        
Political dimension  
 
-0.304 0.905 0.779 1.000       
D_to_Cultural_dim 
 
-0.026 0.223 -0.200 0.333 1.000      
D_to_Political_dim 
 
0.325 -0.758 -0.654 -0.851 0.017 1.000     
Legal  institutions 
 
-0.222 0.829 0.712 0.905 0.545 -0.547 1.000    
Political institutions 
 
-0.296 0.903 0.768 0.993 0.341 -0.842 0.901 1.000   
Structural dimension 
  
-0.096 0.691 0.159 0.868 0.436 -0.752 0.567 0.897 1.000  
D_to_Structural_dim 0.112 -0.373 -0.066 -0.541 0.104 0.770 0.072 -0.575 -0.781 1.000 
Note: Correlations between structural indexes and their distance to legal institutions are only calculated for the subsample of transition economies, since the structure 
dimension variable is not available for countries in the drift subsample. Correlations between other variables are calculated based on the pooled sample of 51 countries.  
Due to a strong correlation that is often found between the key variables, our analysis always checks for the presence of the multi-collinearity problem.  
  
Table 3 
The Long-Term Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth, by Phase of Institutional Dynamics 
Variables 
 
All countries 
 (pooled sample) 
  Countries in the drift phase   Countries at critical junctures  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Distance to Cultural dimension  1.841 -8.145*** -2.109 -8.704*** 10.881*** 0.768 
 (0.41) (-4.73) (-0.52) (-5.19) (2.98) (0.13) 
Distance to Political dimension  -5.712***   -1.707*** -11.364*** -3.147** -1.955*** -1.277*** 
 (-4.05) (-3.93) (-4.99) (-2.69) (-4.60) (-3.27) 
Legal institutions   41.951  36.969***  27.987** 
  (12.26)  (8.13)  (2.60) 
R sq 0.455 0.862 0.662 0.875   0.675 0.758 
Number of observations  51   51 31 31 20 20 
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 Table 4 
The Long-Term Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth,  
Simultaneous Equation Models 
Variables 
The GDP per capita equation 
Pooled sample 
Countries in the drift 
phase 
Countries at critical 
junctures
a
 
Distance to Cultural dimension -10.086*** -9.814***   -12.210 
 (-4.44) (-3.81) (-1.38) 
Distance to Political dimension -1.277** -3.002* -0.258 
 (-2.12) (-1.79) (-0.40) 
Legal institutions  47.713*** 40.294*** 64.174*** 
 (11.43) (6.26) (2.74) 
R sq 0.854 0.869 0.596 
Number of observations  48 30 18 
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. We only report regression coefficients for the growth equation of our 
simultaneous equation models. The channel equations took the following form for the pooled sample: 
Cultural_dim =0.543 – 0.137Fract  + 0.003Protestant + 0.001Catholic + 0.113Latitude (Rsq=0.514) 
Political_dim = 0.623 – 0.166Fract + 0.005Protestant + 0.001Catholic – 0.075Civ_liber (Rsq=0.745)  
Legal_inst = 0.624 – 0.175Fract + 0.005Protestant + 0.001Catholic  –  0.014LO_Socialist  –  0.053LO_French 
+ 0.010LO_German  –  0.153LO_Scandin  (Rsq=0.614) 
 
The channel equations for the drift subsample are as follows:  
Cultural_dim =0.518 – 0.113Fract + 0.003Protestant + 0.001Catholic+ 0.248Latitude (Rsq=0.627) 
Political_dim = 0.803 – 0.127 Fract +0.004Protestant – 0.001 Catholic – 0.105Civ_liber (Rsq=0.782) 
Legal_inst = 0.652 – 0.189Fract + 0.005Protestant + 0.001Catholic + (LO_Socialist  dropped) – 
0.046LO_French + 0.003LO_German  –  0.178LO_Scandin (Rsq=0.619) 
 
The channel equations for the critical junctures subsample can be presented as:   
Cultural_dim =0.363+ 0.070Fract – 0.001Protestant + 0.060Catholic+ 0.310Latitude (Rsq=0.288) 
Political_dim = 0.410 – 0.045 Fract + 0.004Protestant + 0.003Catholic – 0.053Civ_liber (Rsq=0.905) 
Legal_inst = 0.620 – 0.066Fract + 0.003Protestant + 0.001Catholic  + 0.551LO_Socialist + (LO_French 
dropped)+ (LO_German dropped) +(LO_Scandin dropped) (Rsq=0.638),  
where LO_Socialist, LO_French, LO_German , LO_Scandin are dummies indicating countries' legal origin: 
Socialist, French, German, or Scandinavian. The English legal origin is used as a reference category.  
a
 In the case of transition economies, one should interpret the results with some caution due to the limited 
number of observations for this subsample.   
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 Table 5 
The Short-Term Impact of Formal Institutions on Economic Growth, by Phase of Institutional Dynamics 
Variables 
 Countries in the drift phase   Countries at critical junctures  
Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Ln(GDP growth)  -0.167*** -0.177**  0.071** 0.082** -0.147*** -0.185*** -0.129** 
 (-2.85) (-2.66)  (2.68) (2.70) (-3.15) (-3.99) (-2.10) 
Ln(Gross capital formation) 3.333*** 2.891***  0.736** -0.239    
 (3.43) (3.49)  (2.49) (-1.01)    
Ln(Inflation)  -0.125 -0.059  -0.117*** -0.247***    
 (-1.40) (-0.82)  (-5.59) (-7.24)    
Legal institutions  4.920***   -1.098*     
 (4.20)   (-1.87)     
Political institutions   -3.315   14.486*** 1.281 -4.242* -6.028*** 
  (-0.60)   (6.41) (0.48) (-1.76) (-6.78) 
Distance to Cultural dimension      -3.576*   
      (-1.72)   
Political Institutions*Distance to Cultural dimension      7.622*   
      (1.91)   
Distance to Political dimension       4.177***  
       (3.93)  
Politics institutions*Distance to Political dimension       -8.196***  
       (-3.64)  
Distance to Structural dimension        -4.965*** 
        (-3.79) 
Political institutions*Distance to Structural         5.137** 
dimension        (2.15) 
Number of observations  250 209  126 145 101 104 104 
Number of groups  45 48  22 26 21 22 22 
Number of instruments 21 19  21 19 19 19 21 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.173 0.169  0.372 0.145 0.307 0.182 0.312 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.460 0.633  0.250 0.232 0.341 0.535 0.591 
Note:  t-values are reported in parentheses. In addition to the specification choice described in the methodological part of the manuscript, we use the sub-option noleveleq that 
invokes difference instead of system GMM. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. 
Alternative specifications of the model, such as the inclusion of time dummies in the main equation, omitting the collapse sub-option, and restricting instruments only to the 
third or fourth lags of the respective variables, do not change results substantially, which suggests their robustness. In order to achieve acceptable results for the Hansen and 
AR(2) tests, we use a different specification choice for model 4: instruments are restricted only to the fourth lags, whereas the sub-option "collapse" is omitted.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
  
Table 6 
An Extended Analysis of Short-Term Effects of Legal Institutions on Growth Rates for Countries at Critical Junctures
a 
Note:  t-values are reported in parentheses. We use alternative specification choices for models 1 – 3 and 6. In particular, we restrict instruments only to the third lags of the 
respective variables and omit the collapse sub-option. Time dummies are also excluded from the ivstyle option, but are included in the growth equation of model 3 and model 
6.  The alternative specification choice does not change the relationship between legal institutions and rates of economic growth: Results reported for transition economies in 
model 1 of table 5 and model 1 of table 6 are similar, suggesting their robustness. Results reported in model 4 and model 5 are calculated based on the specification choices of 
table 5. To check their robustness, we utilize the alternative specification choice of model 3 of this table and report results in model 6.  
a  
One should interpret the results with some caution since the countries at critical junctures are in recovery from transition recession for the period of our study. Their 
relationship between growth rates and institutional indexes is hence likely to be less tight than in somewhat more stable periods. The logic of our results is, however, in line 
with Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) who also include data for the outset of transition into their analysis (1989 –2004) but still receive support for the non-linearity in the 
relationship between formal institutions and economic growth.             
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Ln(GDP growth)  0.235*** 0.239*** -0.027 -0.075 0.005 -0.252* 
 (42.17) (26.05) (-0.20) (-1.25) (0.16) (-1.87) 
Legal institutions -1.404*** -6.453*** -25.627** -2.684*** -6.229*** -12.335** 
 (-25.25) (-5.34) (-2.29) (-16.75) (-7.03) (-2.63) 
Legal institutions2  4.505*** 19.288*    
  (4.51) (1.94)    
Corruption perception index    0.389*** -0.483*** -2.115** 
    (4.60) (-8.76) (-2.63) 
Legal institutions *Corruption perception index      1.274*** 2.294* 
     (7.24) (1.96) 
Time dummies  no no yes no no yes 
       
Number of observations 129 129 129 125 125 125 
Number of groups  22 22 22 22 22 22 
Number of instruments 21 21 21 18 21 21 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.375 0.325 0.576 0.299 0.296 0.707 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.358 0.409 0.840 0.253 0.272 0.322 
 Table 7 
Predictions of GDP per Capita Levels for Countries at Critical Junctures 
Countries 
Original GDP per 
capita (averaged 
over 1996–2008) 
Predicted GDP per capita, given 
Maximum 
improvements 
in legal 
institutions 
Maximum 
improvements 
in the three 
dimensions 
Maximum 
improvements 
in both legal 
institutions and 
the three 
dimensions 
Albania 3.141 3.680 11.896 16.161 
Armenia 6.843 7.280 15.476 19.409 
Bulgaria 6.409 7.810 14.895 18.413 
Croatia 7.234 9.404 15.560 18.074 
Czech Republic 10.250 13.008 18.102 19.804 
Estonia 14.593 14.860 18.750 22.357 
Georgia 4.100 8.461 15.519 19.411 
Hungary 7.937 12.654 18.632 19.836 
Kyrgyzstan 2.327 8.369 17.284 18.096 
Latvia 10.192 14.570 20.622 21.387 
Lithuania 8.027 13.797 19.264 22.462 
Macedonia 3.410 7.643 14.013 17.980 
Moldova 2.665 4.897 14.173 17.107 
Poland 7.946 13.031 18.593 21.843 
Romania 3.653 10.428 16.676 19.145 
Russia 6.391 10.529 18.212 21.975 
Slovakia 9.561 12.785 18.454 21.208 
Slovenia 14.285 14.390 19.599 20.752 
Ukraine 3.566 7.289 15.715 20.243 
Note.  The predictions are calculated based on the following model: GDP_per_capita= -9.647+ 
0.097Higher_education  – 0.096Government_size + 0.031Savings + 6.957Legal_inst  + 
5.928Cultural_dimension   + 13.432Political_dimension +1.644Structural_dimension.  
Education is operationalized through enrollment ratios in tertiary education. Government_size represents the 
government size expressed as government expenses for operating activities in providing goods and services 
measured as a percentage of GDP. Savings refers to the percentage of GDP in the form of savings. The World 
Bank electronic database is used as the main source for the variables above.  
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Table 1 
List of Countries Used for the Analysis 
Countries in the drift phase Countries at critical junctures 
Basic subsamples Additional countries Basic subsamples Additional countries 
Algeria Austria Albania Belarus  
Argentina Belgium Armenia Tajikistan 
Australia Belize  Azerbaijan Turkmenistan 
Bangladesh Benin Bulgaria Uzbekistan  
Brazil Bolivia Croatia  
Canada Cambodia  Czech Republic  
Chile Comoros  Estonia  
Dominican Republic Congo Georgia  
Egypt Denmark Hungary  
Ethiopia Ecuador Kazakhstan  
Finland Gambia  Kyrgyz Republic  
France Greece Latvia  
Germany Guinea Lithuania  
Ghana Iceland  Macedonia  
Guatemala Iran Moldova  
Indonesia Ireland Poland  
Italy Israel Romania  
Japan Jordan Russia  
Malaysia Kenya Serbia  
Morocco Luxembourg Slovakia  
Netherlands, The  Paraguay Slovenia  
New Zealand Portugal Ukraine  
Norway    
Sweden    
Switzerland    
Taiwan    
Thailand    
Turkey    
United Kingdom, 
The 
   
United States, The     
Uruguay    
    
 
 
